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COMMENTARY: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF
CORPORATE-SECURITIES LAWYERIfNG: BELIEFS,
BIASES AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Roger J. Dennist
As a full time academic administrator my claims to subject
matter expertise are much diminished. Nevertheless, Professor
Norman Poser graciously asked for my comments on Professor
Langevoort's wonderful Article on the epistemology of
corporate and securities lawyering. Professor Langevoort's
Article, which I have renamed "When Bad Things Happen to
Relatively Good Companies," is a model of the best in
contemporary legal scholarship. It begins with a sophisticated
review of research from literature that is not often cited in
legal scholarship, in particular focusing on the literature of
management science (business psychology). Professor
Langevoort utilizes this non-legal perspective to generate
important insights about substantive law, legal education, and
practical issues for corporate lawyers.
The Article reminds us of the range of tasks that our
graduates who will practice business law will face. It implies
that our obligation is to provide a broad range of exposure to
different kinds of learning experiences when training corporate
practitioners. A principal lesson of the Article is that we are
training our graduates to exercise judgment in the context of
uncertainty, uncertainty as both law and facts. Moreover, we
are training our graduates to practice in a profession that is
experiencing ongoing dramatic restructuring. These changes
raise questions about whether historic professional values such
as lawyerly independence can be sustained. Because the
Article is an archetype of the best in contemporary academic
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legal discourse, I will comment on its implications for legal
scholarship, legal education, and the structure of the legal
profession.
Currently, there is a great debate about the nature of
academic scholarship in law. Some important voices have
suggested that legal scholarship produced by law professors
has lost its way.' The claim is made that most legal
scholarship has become irrelevant to the profession as a whole.
The critics claim academic lawyers are producing little
traditional practical doctrinal scholarship that can be of
immediate use to practicing lawyers and judges.2 Instead, too
much scholarship is written primarily for an audience of other
academic lawyers.
Legal scholarship comes in three basic flavors. Traditional
legal (doctrinal) scholarship is largely based on an internal
critique. This mode of scholarship relies almost exclusively on
analysis of legal texts and text-based structural arguments,
and applies rules generated by precedent.3 To the extent that
non-legal perspectives are deemed relevant to such an
analysis, these perspectives are invoked secondarily in making
prudential arguments. A second type of scholarship comes from
the "Law and... movement." "Law and..." scholarship
generates descriptive and normative arguments about law
based upon the intellectual capital of another discipline. The
impact of "Law and..." scholarship has been very strong as
the consequence of the use of economic insights in developing
legal rules on an enormous range of issues.4 The third type of
scholarship is emipirically based social science scholarship, a
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
' There is some substantial empirical question about whether the amount of
doctrinal scholarship produced by academics has declined. Considering the growth
in the number of law professors and the number of law reviews, it is in fact
likely that the amount of traditional doctrinal scholarship produced by academics
has actually increased. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the 'Middle
Ground," 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075, 2099-2101 (1993). Moreover, as the legal
profession has increased in size, the commercial publishing market has responded
by providing a wealth of new treatises and looseleaf services. A third level of
traditional practical scholarship is provided by the bar itself through publications
by continuing legal education providers.
' For a particularly clear account of the styles of argument from this
perspective, see DENNIS PATTERSON, LAw AND TRuTH 135-142 (1996).
' These areas include environmental, tort, and corporate law.
1
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type of scholarship that looks at the social context of rule
formation and enforcement and the actual social consequences
of the implementation of a particular legal rule or regime.5
Professor Langevoort's Article is a classic of the "Law
and..." mode. He thoughtfully examines the management
science literature on the predictable sources of bias in business
decision making. This enables Professor Langevoort to develop
a new framework in which to look at legal issues such as proof
of scienter in securities fraud actions, efficacy of supervision in
the assessment of corporate liability, and the conundrum of
whether reliance on the advice of counsel should be a defense
to particular types of claims. By identifying in a systematic
manner the phenomenon of cognitive conservatism, overoptimism, and commitment bias, his suggestions for legal
evaluation of managerial behavior are greatly enriched.
Professor Langevoort recognizes that these sources of bias have
real adaptive value for managers, but the challenge is to
develop ways of ascertaining when these types of bias create
significant difficulties.
The Article also ties the sources of cognitive bias to
evaluating the role of the business lawyer in counseling. A
challenge is to develop ways for the lawyer to retain sufficent
cognitive independence while capturing the benefits of being
an in-group participant. The lawyer can add real value by
bringing cognitive independence to analysis of a transaction,
but cannot have a perspective so different than management
that she is thought to be irrelevant by managers. The tension
is between the lawyer as a full in-group participant and the
lawyer as inefficient deal killer. Thus, Professor Langevoort's
explanation of the practice of lawyer's overthreatening is most
significant. Mediating the tension becomes all the more
complex when we recognize that the lawyer's own economic
interest does not fully match that of the firm she is
representing.
From the perspective of the intellectual history of
American legal scholarship, Professor Langevoort's work falls
solidly with the realist tradition. The mixture of using

'A good quantity of this scholarship in recent years has analyzed the
structure of the legal profession. See, e.g., MARC GALANTR & THOMAS PALAY,
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FRM (1991).
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economics and business psychology to elegantly elaborate upon
whether the policy basis of a legal rule is sensible reflects the
dominant mode of scholarly discourse since at least the
1940s.6 Professor Langevoort is a "bricoleur."7 Like other
American legal realists he collects ideas from economics,
psychology, and sociology, to develop practical prescriptive
proposals. In the area of corporate law and policy making the
impact of this mode of discourse has been powerful. The
discourse has affected the decisions of legislators,
administrators and judges in areas such as integrated
disclosure, the market for corporate control, and the
calculation of damages in securities fraud actions. Such
scholarship is practical in that, just like traditional doctrinal
scholarship, it enables lawyers to better analyze existing rules
and predict future developments. Moreover, as a normative
matter, legal policy is best created when it is informed by
theory, empirical evidence, and a good sense of the craft of
lawyering. Thus, scholarship like Professor Langevoort's
remains important to both academic and practicing lawyers. As
the Scots would say, claims of a great disjunction between the
academy and the practicing bar is not proved.
Professor Langevoort's Article also has important
implications for the development of law school based training
for future corporate lawyers. In most typical first year
doctrinal law school classes the facts are controlled. Students
seem to get positive feedback from making creative, even
outlandish arguments. They are rarely asked to exercise
judgment in a client centered manner. Competition among law
schools and pressure from the practicing bar8 has led to a
reassessment of whether this type of education is sufficient.
There is an increased understanding that to create well
trained self-learners, legal educators must expose students to a
set of educational experiences richer than simply teaching
legal doctrine and analysis. For example, it is now accepted
6 Gordon, supra note 2, at 2081-82.

The notion of the legal realist as a bricoleur comes from N. E. H. HULL,
ROSCOE POUND AND
KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 10-11 (1997).
8 The pressure from the bar reflects at least in part the growing competition
in the legal profession. Because of the desire to control costs, the bar wishes to
off-load costs traditionally borne by practitioners and clients to the law schools.
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that law students should be trained in interviewing, counseling
and negotiation. Law students should also be prepared to do
fact investigations. A client centered perspective informs this
broader notion of legal education. Students gain a greater
understanding that often ex ante neither the facts nor the law
are fixed. The essence of lawyering is exercise of judgment
under conditions of uncertainty.
There is almost uniform recognition that the skills a new
graduate needs can best be taught by traditional classroom
teaching enriched with experiential learning through
simulations and clinical teaching. A broad-based standard
model exists for the teaching of general litigation skills. Most
law schools today teach pretrial advocacy, trial advocacy, and
interviewing, counseling and negotiation through simulations.
In addition, students participate in actual client
representations through law school clinics.
I would like to sketch out a model for teaching broad
based skills to students who are planning to be transactional
lawyers. Professor Langevoort's Article focuses our attention on
some issues in training future transaction lawyers. In the basic
business organizations class, many professors now include such
exercises as interviewing mythical clients about a choice of
entity problem or those which engage the students in writing a
simple opinion letter on a tranaction where the student needs
to conduct some modest simulated fact investigation. In upper
level courses, more complex simulations can involve students
in counseling simulated clients on the typical problems that a
young in-house counsel may face. In such exercises, the
student must understand the business background and factual
basis of the problem as well as the legal issues. To develop the
client centered perspective, the attorney work product could be
a client memo aimed at the business person.9 The capstone to
such an education might be a semester long simulation of a
complex transaction such as a management buyout."0 Actual

9 At Rutgers we teach a semester long course on corporate counseling, where
students complete four counseling projects. This course is taught with the
assistance of a number of in-house counsel who provide the problems and often

serve as the "lients."
10

For a description of such a course, see Karl S. Okamoto, Learning and

Learning.to-Learn by Doing: Simulating Corporate Practice in Law School, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 498, 502-12 (1995).
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representations of clients in clinical experiences could be
offered in conjunction with a Small Business Administration
Development Center.
In teaching transaction oriented courses, we must
consciously highlight for students the sources of cognitive bias
in clients and in ourselves as lawyers. In teaching such
courses, my experience is that students often take opposed
extreme positions. Some start by taking all of the
representations of their clients at absolute face value without
critical review; others assume that their clients are
underhanded thieves that must be cross-examined obnoxiously
as hostile witnesses. As we know, neither position is correct.
Professor Langevoort gives us a framework for working with
students on the much more subtle role of sympathetic detachment. Thus, our efforts at skills training are informed and
enriched through explicit reference to academic research.
Professor Langevoort's Article is also an important part of
the growing literature concerning the state of professionalism
in the practice of law. In this literature, there is much
discussion about the perception that there has been a decline
in the ethical norms of legal practitioners. Many commentators
deplore a perceived lack of civility among lawyers and a
decrease in the ability of lawyers to give truly independent
counsel to our clients. There is a fear that there has been a
decline in the technical competence and the ethical conduct of
the bar.
The academic in me wants to ask some tough questions
about these perceptions. As we are faced with increasingly
intense economic competition among lawyers, is the current
interest in professionalism merely a nostalgic questing for a
return to a guild-like practice that may have existed in
nineteenth century rural America? It is clear we are no longer
the tight guild of earlier times. By 1990, law had become a $91
billion service industry employing more than 940,000 people.1
The range of practice settings has become increasingly
complex. The profession now supports the 1000 lawyer megafirm, the traditional one or two person local law office and
everything in between. Law has also become a much more

" U.S. Industrial Outlook 1991, Professional Services: Legal Services (SIC 81),
at 52-4.

19971]

COMMENTARY ON LANGEVOORT

personally diverse profession. In the past two decades there
has been an explosion of women and minorities entering the
profession. At the same time, economic competition among
lawyers has escalated significantly.
.The increasing complexity of society is fundamentally
impacting the practice of law. We are in the midst of a
technological revolution based on computers and the
transmission of information at extraordinary rates that will
fundamentally transform many legal tasks. A proficient lawyer
must now have a range of skills from the traditional legal
reasoning and argumentation skills to the skills of
understanding intricate scientific questions that may arise in
litigation or transactional work to the ability to operate
complex computer systems that are now a necessary part of
the practice of law.
As a former antitrust lawyer, I confess a great affection for
the competitive process and change through innovation. Law
should not be immune from the forces of competition. Clients
do benefit from active competition among lawyers.
Sophisticated purchasers of legal services, particularly the
larger corporations that are the focus of Professor Langevoort's
Article, are seeing a dramatic impact in the methods of
providing service. The days of the unquestioned fee-for-service
hourly rate billing for corporate clients by outside counsel are
long gone. And many corporations are internalizing almost all
of their legal work, including the most sophisticated
transactional work. Even individuals have seen a decline in
the relative expense of such services as probate and residential
real estate transactions.
As discussed in my comments on legal scholarship and
legal education, a major focus of Professor Langevoort's Article
relates to the professional value of lawyerly independence. The
conventional story is that increased competition within the
legal profession leads to a loss of traditional lawyerly
independence. Professor Langevoort shows that the
conventional claim is that simple. In the current economic
climate for the legal profession, there are pressures both for
and against lawyerly independence. Both the status of in-group
member and the status of independent expert have adaptive
value.
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As the legal profession continues to restructure, we need
more research linking structure and incentives to performance.
In particular, a fruitful area for further empirical research is
the effect of the expansion of in-house corporate counsel
representation on independence. In-house counsel are pulled in
two directions on developing and maintaining independence.
Certainly there may be more of a risk for in-house counsel of
developing in-group bias. On the other hand, the attenuated
pressures for revenue through direct billings might enhance
incentives for appropriate independence. The balance of
pressures may be affected by the methods of compensation for
in-house counsel and the ways in which services are billed out
to the operating unit.
Another opportunity to gain insight into the problem of
cognitive independence is to compare notions of independence
in accounting and law. The accounting profession is also
undergoing significant restructuring as mergers are decreasing
the number of firms that have the capacity and reputation to
audit large publicly traded companies. Moreover, accounting
firms are increasingly seeing the consulting side of their
business as a major source of revenue. Some have expressed
the concern that independence in auditing will be sacrificed in
the battle to compete for consulting income. How each
profession reacts to economic changes offers an occasion to
reexamine the regulation of independence through ethical
rules. The examination of the issue across professions can only
enrich the inquiry.

